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Abstract There is a wide variety of regulatory instru-
ments available for achieving economic efficiency in markets
where externalities exist. All of them, when correctly designed,
are equally effective, provided that complete information is
available and that adjustments to the level of the instruments
can be made costlessly. However, with the presence of un-
certainty, it is well known that one instrument or another may
produce a higher expected present value of net social benefits
than the others. How uncertainty affects the choice of instru-
ment specifically in fishery management and in other dynamic
optimization settings is less well known.
A combination discrete-time and conUnuous-time stochastic
model of a dynamic fishery is used to compare the relative
performance of a per unit tax and a quota in this paper. The
analysis confirms the conclusion reached in the general liter-
ature on optimal instrument choice under uncertainty: which
instrument performs most efficiently depends on the specific
fishery being regulated.
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Introduction
Consensus has been reached in the genera! literature initiated by
Weitzman (1974) on tbe point that with perfect information, all
properly designed regulatory instruments must be ranked equally
on the basis of economic efficiency (see .e.g., Laffont 1977: Yohe
1978; and Dasgupta and Heal 1979).' However, this literature
also demonstrates that when relatively simple instruments are
used in the face of uncertainty, one instrument or combination
of instruments may outperform the others."
To date, however, few researchers have delved specifically
into the relative performance under uncertainty of alternative
regulatory instruments in fishery management and other dy-
namic optimization problems. Moreover, the applicability of the
work which has been done in this area (e.g., Brown and Boon-
therawara 1982 and Koenig 1984a and 1984b),^ as well as of the
voluminous literature on optimal harvest and effort rate control,*
is limited by the use of models which essentially consider time
to be either strictly discrete or strictly continuous. Neither ap-
proach may be completely satisfactory when used alone.
The conclusions of Brown and Boontherawara and of Koenig.^
for example, are derived from a discrete-time dynamic program-
ming model, and are limited to fisheries in which no natural stock
growth occurs during the fishing season. This structure is ap-
proximated only in fisheries with very short open seasons or very
slow growth rates during the season. Policy implications of con-
tinuous-time analyses, on the other hand, tend to be impractical
in that they require continuous monitoring of stock size and con-
tinuous adjustment of the chosen regulatory instrument. In real-
ity, measurement of stock size and adjustment of instrument
level are accomplished only periodically. That is, there are in-
strument adjustment costs which are ignored in these models.
While these models may adequately approximate reality in
some cases, there is potential benefit in developing an approach
which incorporates both the continuous-time nature of fishing
and stock dynamics in many fisheries and the discrete-time na-
ture of regulatory behavior.^ The longer the season and the faster
the rate of change in stock size, the less appropriate are strictlyTaxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries J85
discrete- and strictly continuous-time models, and the greater is
the potential benefit.^
The purposes of this paper are to present a simple combination
discrete-time and continuous-time stochastic fishery model, and
to use the model to incorporate uncertainty into the decision
process for choosing the optimal type and level of regulatory
instrument. The two instruments selected for comparison are a
per unit tax and a system of allocated quotas. The paper extends
research begun in Anderson (1984).
One of the unique implications of the combined discrete-time
and continuous-time model is that uncertainty about the stock
growth rate is important in the choice of instrument; in both
strictly continuous-time and strictly discrete-time models,
growth rate uncertainty is irrelevant to this choice. However,
the general conclusion that the optimal choice of simple instru-
ment depends on tbe fishery under consideration remains valid
in the combination approach.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, a simple
deterministic fishery optimization model is presented; in the fol-
lowing section, the model is made stochastic and a rule for op-
timal regulatory instrument choice is derived; then implications
of the rule are discussed; and finally, the paper is summarized.
Deterministic Steady-State Model
A continuous-time dynamic model to which Pontryagin's max-
imum principle is applied can be used to identify the relevant
marginal benefit and cost functions of fishery production. The
objective is to maximize the present value of the stream of net
social benefits, defined as consumer and producer surpluses,
over time:
max
subject to the constraint that net stock growth rate equals natural
growth rate minus harvest rate:
A-, = Fix,) - H.186 Eric E. Anderson
In addition, the maximization is also subject to the initial stock
and non-negativity constraints.
In the above formulae, r is the (constant) discount rate, X, is
the size offish stock at instant /, H, is the instantaneous rate of
harvest at instant r, B{H,) is the instantaneous total consumption
benefit rate, C(A',, H,) is the instantaneous total harvest cost
rate, and F(Xr) is the instantaneous natural stock growth (surplus
production) rate. A dot over a symbol indicates the derivative
with respect to time of a cumulative quantity or stock variable.
The Hamiltonian is:
,, H,) -H UFiX,) - H,)}
where \, is the co-state variable. The maximizing conditions are:
1. Bnik,) ' CMX,,H,) ' k, = 0
2. -CxiX,,H,) + \,FAX,) = -K + \,rand
3. X, = Fix,) - Hr
where BH and CH are the partial derivatives of total benefit and
total cost, respectively, with respect to harvest rate (i.e., mar-
ginal benefit and marginal cost), and Cx and FA- are partial de-
rivatives with respect to stock size.
Assuming that the optimum time path rapidly leads to or ap-
proaches a steady state, the analysis is confined to steady-state
situations, so set k, = X, = 0. The three equations can now be
solved for optimal steady-state values of//,, X,, and \,.
Rearranging 1 and 2 yields:




In optimal control theory, \, is the marginal value of the stock
at time / (Dorfman 1969), assuming that optima! harvesting strat-
egy will be followed from then on. Thus, Equation 4 means the
control variable, //,, should be selected so as to set the difference
between tnarginal benefit and marginal harvest cost equal to mar-
ginal stock value, given the values of A", and \, inherited from
the previous instant.Taxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 187
Stock size, X, is not a control variable. However, since our
primary interest is in the steady state to which the system is
driven, we can treat the problem as one of indirectly choosing
(through control of tbe harvest rate) the optimal steady-stock
size. Treating steady-state stock size as the control variable per-
mits a straightforward application of Weitzman's analysis of in-
strument choice, as will be shown later in the paper.
Seen from this perspective. Equation 4 means that X should
be chosen so as to set the marginal value of stock equal to the
marginal cost of obtaining it. The term B,, - CM is marginal
stock opportunity cost, since it is the rate at which profit must
be foregone while the harvesting rate is temporarily reduced by
one unit per period so that stock size can be allowed to grow at
the rate of one unit per period. Making use of the steady-state
condition, H = FiX), we find that marginal steady-state stock
cost, MSC, is solely a function of A";
6. MSCiX) = BniFiX)) - C^iX, FiX))
Equation 5 can be derived by differentiating an expression
defining the present value of the net benefit stream when the
optimal time path for the control variable is assumed to be fol-
lowed at every instant. In solving the problem of which steady-
state stock level to choose, however, we can use the more easily
understood concept of the steady-state marginal stock value: the
derivative with respect to X of the present value of the (constant)
consumer and producer surplus stream to be yielded by any level
of stock, if that level of stock were to be held constant forever.
This steady-state marginal stock benefit is:
- CiX, //)]
rdX
Carrying out the differentiation and making use of the steady-
state constraint, H = FiX), we find that this is also a function
solely of A*, designated MSB:
7. MSBiX) = ^- {[BniFiX)) - CffiX, FiX))]FxiX)
- CxiX, FiX))}MSH
FIGURE 1. Optima! steady state.
X* X MAX
It is easily shown that MSB ^ X at the optimal level of A' (chosen
by equating MSB with MSC), where \ is given by equation 5
(see the Appendix).
Figure 1 depicts the solution to the problem of choosing the
optimal steady-state stock size, designated A'*. The quantity T*
is the optimal per unit tax to charge fishermen if the fleet is
characterized by competitive conditions so that the marginal in-
stantaneous harvest cost function, CniX. //). is the industry fish
supply curve for given levels of X, Since the fishing fleet will
harvest at the rate at which marginal harvest cost equals ex ves-
sel price less the tax, tbe function MSCiX) B^iX) - CniX)
can be used to derive the steady-state stock size which results
from any level of a per unit tax. When tax T is specified, the
fleet will harvest in a way which will drive the stock to the steady-
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state harvest rate, H*, is found by examining the growth func-
tion, FiX), shown in Figure I as having the well-known "dome"
shape. The quantity XMSH is the stock size which produces max-
imum sustainable harvest, and XMAX^^ carrying capacity.
In this deterministic model, the tax, quota, and other instru-
ments are equally efficient. The correct output rate. //*, which
can be achieved by means of a correctly designed quota system,"
and the correct tax, 7^, which will elicit H* when stock size
reaches A'*, are known with certainty. Either instrument will
drive the stock to X*, the correct level, as long as initial stock
size is to the right of XMSH-
A problem in both deterministic and stochastic steady-state
models is the inability of a quota to drive the stock to a desired
equilibrium level on the left side of the stock growth dome. Such
an equilibrium is unstable, as is shown in Figure 2. The quantity
X* is the desired equilibrium stock level and //*, the corre-
sponding harvest rate. If harvest is controlled by a quota set at
//* and if initial stock is greater than A'*, the rate of natural
growth of the stock, FiX), is greater than //*, and stock grows
to A". If initial stock level is less than A'*, then FiX) is less than
Q
FIGURE 2. Instability of quota equilibrium oti left side of yield dome.190 Eric E. Anderson
H*, so the stock is driven to the level which it would reach in
the absence of regulation.
This means that if the desired stock level is on the left side of
the dome, a constant tax is superior to a constant quota, rather
than equally as efficient. In the stochastic case, the simplest way
to deal witb the problem is to refuse to consider using a quota
unless the expected value of optimal equilibrium stock size re-
sulting from the use of a quota is "safely" to the right of XMSH-
Of course, "safely" would be arbitrarily defined. Another al-
ternative is to account explicitly for tbe probability of failure to
reach desired stock level through use of a quota and the attendant
welfare loss. It is assumed in what follows that the probability
of either optimal or actual equilibrium occurring on the left side
of the dome is negligible.
Stochastic Model
In the deterministic model, note that a change in one or more
of the parameters of the system results in a shifting of both
MSBiX) and MSCiX), and a new optimal steady-state stock size.
The new value of X* does not depend on whether or not the new
parameter values are known with certainty before the change
occurs, although the course of the optimal transition path be-
tween the old X* and the new one does (Clark and Munro 1975).
In the stochastic model developed here, certain parameters
change value periodically, with their new values being unpre-
dictable. That is, random disturbances are introduced into some
of the parameters. The disturbances are assumed to change value
only at the beginning of each unit time period. This assumption
thus adds a discrete-time element to the continuous-time model
described in the previous section.
Assuming just for the moment that the new values taken by
the disturbances in each period are known as soon as the change
occurs, we have a model in which the parameters change every
period, resulting in an optimal time path which leads to a new
steady-state X* and corresponding full-information optimal tax
and harvest rate quota.
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only at the beginning of each period, it is also assumed that
regulatory instrument levels can be adjusted by the regulating
authority only at tbe beginning of each period. This is an ex-
treme, but easily analyzed, way of treating instrument adjust-
ment costs.
The approach taken here also requires the assumption that the
fishery system proceeds to a steady state in every period, and
that the amount of net economic benefits accumulated during
the transition to a new steady state (made necessary by the
change in disturbance values) in each period is insignificant com-
pared to the amount of net economic benefits accumulated in
the steady state. Although this assumption is a strong one. it
may not be unreasonable for fisheries taking place on rapidly
growing stocks, and in which environmental (both ecological and
economic) fluctuations are moderate or occur at relatively long
intervals. It allows focusing on the performance of alternative
regulatory instruments during the steady states, while ignoring
their relative performance during transitions. Focusing on steady
states, in turn, facilitates analysis of optimal instrument choice
using Weitzman's framework.
Note that in this model, the realized steady state in each period
does not depend on the size of the fish stock at the beginning of
the period. Rather, it depends only on the realized parameter
values in the consumption benefit, harvest cost, and stock
growth functions, and the level of the chosen instrument.
The ex ante optimal level of the regulatory instrument also
does not depend on stock size at the beginning of the period. It
depends only on the expected values of the function parameters.
Note further that since the expected values of the parameters
do not change from one period to the next, neither does the ex
ante optimal level of the instrument.
Now the basic functions can be given more specific form:
8. B(//,, H-) = ibo + |JL)//, - y ^' (total benefit),
9. CiX,, H., v) = ico + V - C2X,)H, + y ^' (total fishing
cost), and192 Eric E. Anderson
10. X. = Fix,, e) -//, = € -^ /o - f^X, - H, (stock growth),
where all the subscripted lower case letters are known param-
eters and |JL, V, and € are stochastic disturbances. All parameters
except c'o are assumed to be non-negative. The disturbances are
assumed to be independently distributed, with expected values
of zero and known variances.
The stock growth function (Equation 10) is shown as being
linear in the stock size variable. With /„ and /i assumed positive,
it can be viewed as an approximation to the right side of a par-
abolic or other dome shaped growth function. Linearization is
necessary to make the problem analytically tractable, although
more complicated functional forms can be dealt with using nu-
merical methods.
The problem facing tbe regulators is that they must decide
which instrument to use, and at what level to set it, before they
know the values of \k, u. and e, which are determinants of the
full-information optimum levels. This uncertainty is depicted in
Figure 3. For diagrammatic simplicity, the distributions of tbe
disturbances are assumed to consist of only two possible values
for each of |j,, u, and €, with each value having a probability of
occurring of 0.5. There are two possible states of the world. If
State 1 occurs, A/5B| andA/SC, are the true positions of marginal
stock benefit and cost because disturbance values are |JLI , u,, and
ei. The position of the growth function in State I. when e - e,.
is F,. Analogous statements apply to MSBj, MSC2. and F2. Tbe
quantities Xf, T*, and //* are, respectively, the full-information
optimal values of stock size, per unit tax, and harvest rate, if
State / occurs. The quantity T" is the level of the tax which would
actually be imposed, resulting in a stock level of either Xy or
X{. The quantity Q' is level of the quota which would actually
be imposed, resulting in either X\ or X'2.'^ The triangles shaded
with vertical lines represent welfare loss which would be in-
curred in each state of the world if T" is imposed, and the tri-
angles shaded with horizontal lines are welfare loss under a quota
ofg'.
The regulators face two decisions: which instrument to em-
ploy, and at what level to set the chosen instrument. AssumingTaxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 193
FIGURE 3. Expected welfare losses under tax and quota.
the regulators are risk neutral, the latter decision is easily dis-
pensed with, for if growth and marginal cost and benefit are linear
with parallel shifting, setting the chosen instrument at the ex-
pected value of its full-information optimal level will result in
the minimum expected value of welfare loss (or equivalently. the
maximum expected value of net benefits).
Given that the instrument selected will be set at its optimal
level, the question of which instrument gives the lowest expected
welfare loss is raised. That question is answered by developing
explicit expressions for the expected welfare loss with each in-
strument. The expected welfare loss with the quota, WL', is
11. E[WL'] = E\
(A" - A'*) iMSCiX') - MSBiX'))
where E is the expectation operator. This is simply the expected
value of the area of the welfare loss triangle exemplified in Figure
3. Similarly, the expected welfare loss with the per unit tax is:194 Eric E. Anderson
12 E[WL"] =
)!
The disturbances in Equations 11 and 12 have been suppressed
in the interest of simplicity.
Before proceeding, explicit expressions for MSB and MSC
must be written incorporating Equations 8, 9 and 10 into 6 and
7. Begin witb MSC:
13. MSCiX, \x,v,€) = \L-v-ibi + c,)e + [bo - Co -
This can be simplified by writing:
14. MSCiX, -(]) = f] + A + BX
where t] = ^i - v - (by + C|)£
A = bo - Co - ibi + ci)/o and
B = C2 + ih, -h c,)/,
Following the same process with MSB yields:
15. MSBiX, ^L, V. e) = - {-/,(M. - XJ) -^ [c, + {b, -h c,)/,]€
r
-/|[^) - Co -(/?! + C-|)/o] + C2/0
16. A/5B(^, to) = o) -h C + DA'
whereto = -[-/I(IJL - -u) -h Be]
r
C = -[-f,A
Some of the terms in Equations 11 and 12 can now be described
more fully.
The full-information optimal stock level, A"*, is found by equat-
ing MSC with MSB:
17. A/5C(Ar*, 7i) = MSBiX*, w) or
Ti -I- A -f- BAT* = to -1- C -K DAT*Taxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 195
Solving for A'* gives
- C-A
where X = ~—Tjthe expected value of steady-state stock size.
The optima! level of the tax, V, is the expected value of the
full-information optimal tax. 7*:
19. r = E[T*] = E[MSCiX*, T])] = A + BX
The optimal level of the harvest rate quota. Q', is the expected
value of the full-information optimal harvest rate, //*:
20. Q' = EIH"^] = £[F(^*, e)] = /o - f^X
The level to which stock will be driven when the tax is im-
posed, X", is found by equating MSC with T":
21. MSCiX", -n) = r
Solving for X" gives:
22. X" = X -'^
a
Finally, A", the level to which stock is driven when the quota
is imposed, is found by writing the steady state condition:
23. FiX',^) = Q'
and solving for A", which gives
lA. X' = X + ^
j\
Substituting Equations 14, 16, 18, and 24 into Equation 11,
multiplying through, and taking expectations gives
25. E[WL'] = Uul. - aL) + ^^7^ <JI
Ji ^J]
- u)
where a^ with subscripts is the variance or covariance of the196 Eric E. Anderson
indicated variable(s). Substituting Equations 14, 16, 18, 19, and
22 into Equation 12, multiplying through, and taking expecta-
tions give
26. E[WL"] = —^ (jl aL
IBHB - D) ^ BiB - D) """
1 2
"^ 2(B - D) ^"*
Subtracting Equation 26 from Equation 25 and simplifying
gives (following Weitzman) the "coefilcient of comparative ad-
vantage of a per unit tax over a quota system," the CCA:
27. CCA = ^al-^.l^ + ?^^l
1( 2 _ 2 >.
fl '^^ *^
The CCA provides the basis for a decision rule in choosing
between a per unit tax and a quota system to regulate the fishery:
if the CCA is positive, the tax will be superior; if the CCA is
negative, the quota system will be superior; if the CCA is zero,
they are equally efficient.
Recalling that B and D are the slopes of marginal steady-state
stock cost and benefit, respectively (see equations 14 and 16),
and that T\ and to are their disturbances, it can be easily shown
that the first two terms of Equation 27 are identical to Weitz-
man's coefficient of comparative advantage of a price control
over a quota system when marginal benefit and marginal cost
are correlated. This is because levying a per unit tax on harvested
fish is equivalent to controlling the price received by fish stock
owners (the public) for holding stock. The remaining terms in
Equation 27 represent the effect of stochasticity on the stock
growth function and therefore about the relationship between
harvest rate and equilibrium stock level.
Now in order to write the CCA in terms of the original pa-
rameters of the model, substitute from Equations 14 and 16 into
Equation 27 to obtain:Taxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 197
• + ci)^(r - /,) ib, +
\lr\c2 + (/?, +
+ c,)(fi - r)
Ir
(r - /,)[C2 + (fe, + 2
Discussion
Equation 28 contains two major components. The first compo-
nent consists of a term in braces multiplied by the sum of the
benefit and cost uncertainties, CT^ -!- tr^. The second component
consists of another term in braces multiplied by the stock growth
rate variance, a;.
The bracketed term in the first component is always positive,
but the second bracketed term cannot be signed without the pa-
rameter values of a specific fishery, even when ex vessel price
and marginal harvest cost are constant, i.e. when /?, = C| = 0.
Therefore, the sign of the CCA, and hence, the ranking of the
tax and quota instruments, depends on the fishery in question.
One slightly more conclusive statement that can be made,
however, is that the greater the variances of the consumption
benefit and harvesting cost disturbances, [x. and v, the better is
the relative performance of the tax. To see this clearly, first note
that in the unlikely special case of no uncertainty about the
growth rate (a; = 0), tbe CCA is unambiguously positive (mean-
ing the tax is always preferred). This is not surprising, because
the stock benefit and cost disturbances, t] and to, are negatively
correlated when e is fixed at its expected value of zero, and as
Weitzman shows, negative correlation between marginal benefit
and marginal cost increases the relative attractiveness of price
control (per unit tax in the present fishery model), other things
being equal. Fluctuations of the marginal benefit and cost curves
in opposite directions cause greater variation in the full-infor-198 • . Eric E. Anderson
mation optimal output rate (stock size in the fishery model), and
a fixed producer price allows the realized, or actual, output rate
to vary in the same direction, although not as widely. This guar-
antees that realized output rate will turn out to be closer to the
full-information optimal rate than a fixed harvest rate quota can
be.
Next, with crl still set at 0, note that the larger the sum ofthe
variances of \i and v, the greater the superiority ofthe tax. This
result occurs because the variances of T] and w are both directly
related to the sum of aj and ul, and the larger the sum, the more
widely marginal stock benefit and cost fluctuate in opposite
directions.
Another interesting special case is the one of constant and
certain ex vessel price and marginal harvest cost. i.e. bi, ci,
CT^, and CTC all equal to zero. In this case, where uncertainty exists
only with respect to the growth function, the CCA reduces to
CCA = —p
The sign ofthe CCA then depends on the sign ofthe expression
</^ - .fl + ''), which is quadratic in /,. the negative ofthe slope
ofthe growth function. The sign of this expression, in turn, de-
pends on the discount rate, r. and the slope ofthe growth func-
tion in the following way:
If the discount rate is greater than 0.25, the quadratic expres-
sion has no real roots, and the CCA is positive for all values of
/i. A tax is therefore superior to a quota system. If the discount
rate is equal to 0.25, the taxis either superior to the quota system
or equivalent to it, equivalency obtaining only if/i is equal to
0.5, the one real root of the quadratic expression. If the discount
rate is less than 0.25, as seems most likely, the CCA is positive
(tax superior) for all values of/i less than [1 - (1 - 4r)'^^]/2,
negative (quota superior) for all values of/i between [1 - (1 -
4r)°*^]/2 and [1 -i- (1 - 4r)^-^]/2, and positive again for all values
of/i greater than [1 -I- (1 - 4rf-^]/2. Of course the CCA is zero
when /i is equal to either of these two real roots ofthe quadratic
expression.Taxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 199
The values taken by the two roots when r is less than 0.25
range from a minimum of zero for the lower root to a maximum
of zero for the upper root, both of which obtain when r is zero.
As r rises from one towards 0.25, the value of the lower root
rises and the value of the upper root falls until they converge at
a value of 0.5.
The dominance of the tax at high discount rate levels can be
explained as follows: Examination of Equation 14 shows that
when demand and supply are perfectly elastic and known with
certainty (ht, C\, \x, and v all equal to zero), the marginal stock
cost disturbance, -q, is zero. Thus, marginal stock cost is not
stochastic in this special case.
Note especially that MSC is no longer affected by the growth
rate disturbance, e, when perfect elasticity obtains. This is be-
cause MSC is the difference between Bfi and C//, the rate at
which current net benefit is foregone while harvesting tempo-
rarily is slowed to allow the stock to grow. When B/f and C//
are both constant with respect to harvest rate, the difference
between them does not depend on the current //,, and it is only
through its effect on steady-state H, that the growth rate dis-
turbance enters the expression for MSC.
Equation 16, moreover, shows that while marginal stock ben-
efit is still affected by the growth disturbance, at high discount
rate levels the effect is small (changes in future benefits foregone
are heavily discounted). Therefore, with the MSB and MSC
curves shifting (see Figure 3) very little and not at all, full-in-
formation optimal steady-state stock size fluctuates very little,
as well. Since the MSC curve is also the tax response function,
realized steady-state stock size will be constant under a fixed
tax, and therefore will remain close to optimal stock size.
On the other hand, a fixed quota will result in more widely
varying realized stock size as the stock growth rate curve, FCA"),
shifts up and down with changes in e.
At low discount rate levels, the shifting of^MSB due to change
in e is more pronounced, and full-information optimal stock size
has more variance. The efficiency of the tax, which results in
constant realized stock size, is diminished. The relative per-
formance ofthe instruments then depends on the slope of growth200 1 Eric E. Anderson
rate function, -/,, which is a determinant of both optimal and
realized stock size. This parameter affects realized stock size
when a quota is used, since in steady state, Q' = F(X). It affects
full-information optimal stock size when either instrument is
used, through its effect on the slope ofthe MSB curve.
Specifically, for vertical shifts of given magnitude, the steeper
is F(A'), i.e. the higher is /i, the lower is the variation in realized
stock size under a quota, which improves the efficiency of the
quota. At the same time, however, the higher is /i, the steeper
is M55,'" and the lower is the variation in full-information op-
timal stock size. This improves the efficiency of the tax. As is
shown above, the difference in expected value of welfare loss
between the two instruments is a nonlinear function of/i.
The discrete-time analysis performed by Koenig (1984a and
1984b) yielded the conclusion that stock growth rate stochastic-
ity has no bearing on the optimal choice of instrument." Use of
a continuous-time model gives the same result. The reason for
this perhaps surprising implication of the conventional models
is as follows: Stochasticity of the rate of (future) stock growth
has no effect on current private fishing cost. Therefore, it has
no direct effect on the harvest rate chosen by fishermen under
any of the instruments which have been considered. It is the
different distributions of unpredictable harvest rates to be chosen
by fishing fleets under alternative regulatory instruments which
accounts for the differences in economic efficiency among
instruments.
The appearance of CT< in Equation 28 proves the importance
of stock growth rate stochasticity in optimal instrument choice
in the hybrid model. In fact, as is shown above, in the absence
of growth rate stochasticity the choice is clear (tax), and it is
only the term which is multiplied by crl that makes the sign of
the CCA indeterminate.
The importance of growth rate stochasticity in the hybrid
model is due to the fact tbat, since the stock experiences con-
tinuous natural growth during the fishing season (which is offset
in steady state by fishing mortality), the value ofthe growth rate
disturbance affects the size ofthe stock in steady state. This, in
turn, affects fishing cost during the current season.Taxes Vs. Qttotas for Regulating Fisheries 201
Summary
This paper has described a fishery optimization model which
combines elements of discrete-time models and continuous-time
models. The purpose was to more realistically analyze fisheries
in which fishing and stock population dynamics take place in
continuous time, but where regulatory decisions are made at
discrete intervals. The model was used to derive a rule for choos-
ing between a per unit tax and a harvest rate quota as regulatory
instruments.
The general conclusion of previous analyses of optimal in-
strument choice that policy makers must make the choice on a
case-by-case basis was upheld. Some specific conclusions
unique to the hybrid model are:
1. The greater the uncertainty regarding the benefit (demand)
and fishing cost functions, the more likely is a tax to be the
superior instrument.
2. If the benefit and fishing cost functions are known and if
marginal benefit and marginal fishing cost are constant, the
choice depends entirely on the discount rate and the (absolute
value of the) slope of the stock growth rate function. When the
discount rate is greater than 0.25, the tax is always preferred.
When the discount rate is less than 0.25. the tax is preferred if
the slope ofthe growth rate function is low. the quota is preferred
if the slope is in an intermediate range, and the tax is once again
preferred if the slope is high.
3. Uncertainty regarding the stock growth rate has an impor-
tant role in the choice of instrument. Ifthe growth rate is known,
the tax is preferred, but if growth rate is uncertain, either in-
strument may prove superior.
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Notes
1. There may be distributional, social, political, administrative, or
enforcement considerations which swing the balance in favor of one
or another, but in terms of maximizing the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses, none can be shown to be superior.
This conclusion follows from the fact that when complete information
is available, the economically efficient rates of production for an in-
dustry and its member firms are known. If there are no constraints on
the levels at which regulatory instruments can be set or on the fre-
quency with which they can be adjusted, any correctly designed in-
strument can be set at the level which elicits this rate.
Even in the presence of uncertainty, if it is feasible to implement
contingency rules which specify the level of the instrument under all
possible future states of the world, all properly designed instruments
perform equally well. But because such rules are complicated, or be-
cause the information required to implement them is too costly to ac-
quire, they are not used.
2. The key requirement leading to this result is that while the level
of an instrument must be set before all the relevant information is
gathered, the firms subject to regulation can make their production
decisions after more information has become available. Therefore, the
firms will produce different rates of output ex post under different
instruments, and the corresponding levels of realized net economic
benefits will also differ. More importantly, the expected values of net
economic benefits differ ex ante. Which instrument yields the highest
expected value of net benefits depends on the parameter values of the
model being used to describe the regulated activity.
Weitzman considered a model in which marginal benefit and marginal
cost are linear, with known slopes. The uncertainty is in the vertical
position of these curves, but means and variances ofthe intercept dis-
turbances are known. No instrument can, except by chance, be set in
advance at the full-information optimum level, and therefore some wel-
fare loss is to be expected. Assuming that any instrument chosen will
be set at the level which minimizes expected welfare loss for that in-
strument, Weitzman determined that the difference in expected welfare
loss under price controls and under quantity controls depends on the
values of the slopes, variances, and covariances, the number of sep-
arate production units, and the correlation between the marginal cost
uncertainties ofthe individual production units (firms or plants). In the
simplest case, in which the cost uncertainties ofthe production units
are perfectly correlated and the aggregate cost and benefit disturbancesTaxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 203
are uncorrelated, the choice of instruments depends only on the relative
slopes of the marginal cost and benefit curves. For example, when the
marginal cost (supply) curve is less steep than the marginal benefit
curve, quotas are preferred to controls on the price received by pro-
ducers. A partial explanation is that vertical perturbations ofthe supply
curve will result in relatively large over- or under-production if the
price is fixed when supply is highly elastic.
3. Two other interesting papers on the relative performance of al-
ternative instruments in fisheries are Beddington and May (1977) and
Andersen (1982). However, unlike the present paper and all the others
cited in it, these studies were not concerned with maximizing the
present value ofthe fishery. Beddington and May, who are biologists,
compared the time required for a population to return to equilibrium
after a disturbance under constant effort rate and constant harvest rate
policies, and did not consider economic behavior. Andersen, like
Weitzman and most of the other economists writing on this subject,
compared instruments on the basis of expected value of net economic
benefits. Using a static steady-state bioeconomic model and assuming
that the only uncertainty is in the exogenous ex vessel price, he con-
cluded that when fishermen are risk averse but society is risk neutral,
the expected value of fishermen rents exclusive of risk costs is max-
imized by controlling the price. This transfers the risk from fishermen
to society as a whole.
4. See, for example, Gordon (1954), Plourde (1970), Brown (1974),
Clark and Munro (1975), and Burt and Cummings (1977). In other
words, the focus has been on how to optimally set the levels of two
or three individual instruments. A subset of this literature has dealt
with optimal management under uncertainty. See Burt (1964), Reed
(1979), Ludwig (1980), and Charies (1983). Also see Andersen and Su-
tinen (1981) for a survey ofthe literature on fisheries and uncertainty.
5. Koenig (1984a and 1984b) used a linear-quadratic dynamic pro-
gramming model and an approach similar to Weitzman's to analyze the
choice of instrument in a fishery and extended the analysis to other
instruments in addition to quotas and controls on prices received by
producers, including per unit and ad valorem taxes and controls on
prices paid by consumers. He found that when the size of the fish stock
can be accurately observed, a combination of per-unit and ad valorem
taxes always outperforms the other instruments. If, however, this com-
bination tax is not feasible, his conclusion is similar to Weitzman's,
i.e., the choice of instrument depends on certain parameter values in
the fishery being modelled. These parameters include the slope ofthe
social marginal cost function, which is the sum ofthe private and ex-204 Eric E. Anderson
ternal marginal costs. In this context, marginal external cost is the
discounted future surplus foregone by society when current production
is increased.
Brown and Boontherwara (1982) applied Koenig's model to the Pa-
cific halibut fishery, a fishery with short open seasons and a slow stock
growth rate and hence, an apparently good candidate for this model.
They concluded that a quota system would be superior to a control of
the price paid by consumers.
6. The new approach will be applied both to setting instruments at
their optimal levels and to choosing the optimal instrument.
7. It has been suggested that a rapid stock growth rate reduces the
need for careful management ofthe stock because the stock can recover
quickly from overfishing. In other words, nature "forgives" manage-
ment errors. However, forgiveness is forthcoming only if errors are
detected and corrected. If inappropriate models are used continually
for management, the welfare loss might be significant.
8. In such a system the industry quota should be specified as an
instantaneous aggregate harvest rate. If an instantaneous rate quota is
approximated by, say, a weekly quota, then every firm should be as-
signed a specified part of the aggregate quantity, in order to keep firms
from fishing too fast early in the week as each strives to catch as large
a share ofthe aggregate harvest as possible.
Of course, the individual firm quotas must be allocated in a way that
minimizes the total cost of harvesting a given aggregate quota.
9. For simplicity, it is assumed that quotas are always binding con-
straints, i.e. that conditions never arise under which the fleet prefers
to catch less than the quota amount.
10. Because when absolute stock growth rate declines rapidly with
increasing stock size, so does the marginal benefit from holding a larger
stock.
11. Provided the size of the fish stock at the beginning of each period
can be accurately measured. Koenig (1984a) also concludes that when
initial stock size cannot be measured accurately, growth rate uncer-
tainty does have an indirect effect on the choice of instrument.
Appendix ,
Derivation of Selected Equations
MSB = X (Page 188)
It is easily shown that at the optimum point, MSB, defined by Equa-
tion 7, is equal to X, defined by Equation 5. Repeating Equation 5,Taxes Vs. Quotas for Regulating Fisheries 205
we have
X = -^^- (A.OI)
Fx - r
Multiplying both sides by the denominator ofthe right side gives
- r) = Cx (A.02)
Multiplying X through the left side and transferring \Fx to the right
sides gives
- kr = Cx - \Fx ' (A.03)
Dividing both sides by -r gives
X - i {\Fx - Cx] (A.04)
Finally, we substitute the optimizing condition X = BH - CH, Equation
4, for X in the right side to obtain
X = i {[BH - CH]FX - Cx} (A.05)
I
the right side of which is MSB.
CCA (Equation 28)
Equation 1.27 is derived from Equation 27 by substituting the defini-
tions for B and D from Equation 14 and Equation 16 into Equation 1.27
and by breaking CT^, CT^O.. cr^^, and ul^ into the variances of p., v, and
e. The latter step is accomplished as follows:
= Var(fx - v - (h^ + c,)e)
= irl + ui + {hi + c,)V. (A.06)
= COV(TI, W) = Cov(fi ~ V - (hi + Ci)e, -[-/i(|x - v) + Be])
-V - {h, + c,)e) -(-fiihi + c,) + B€)
r • .
(recall that E[ii] = E[v] = £[e] = 0.)206 Eric E. Anderson
(recall that E[n.v] = E[ix.i\ = EM = 0.)
- -[fli^l + (TD - {by + Cy)Bul\.
Cov(7i, e) = Cov((i - V - {bx + c,)e, e)
- V - {by + ci)e)e] = -(6, -h c) £le
Cov(a>, e) = Cov(-[-/i(p. ~ v) + 5e, e
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